Still no response from Maryland Board of Elections on request by Cindy Walsh for an audit of Baltimore election results made November 12, 2014. I will be mailing this second request on Wednesday, December 3, 2014. There were enough claims of election violations in Baltimore to justify this recount and audit and we expect to see the Maryland Board of Elections direct Baltimore City Elections to arrange this audit. Maryland has no election audit law so we are demanding what citizens in other states have established----a citizens audit process.
December 3, 2014
To:
Linda H. Lamone -State Election Administrator
151 West Street, Suite 200
Annapolis, MD 21401
From:
Cindy Walsh
2522 N. Calvert St
Baltimore, Maryland 21218
RE: Widespread election irregularities in the Maryland General Election
Ms. Lamone,
It has been widely reported and there are numerous independent claims of election tampering around the State of Maryland. This is especially true in the City of Baltimore. Cindy Walsh for Governor of Maryland in the Democratic Primary already has a lawsuit in the Special Court of Appeals contesting the original Democratic primary because of systemic election irregularities by 501c3 and FCC regulated media outlets ignoring Federal election laws regarding forums, debates, and access to media and the deliberate attempt to deny primary candidates their rights as citizens to run for office with the expectation of free and fair elections and protection from our Maryland Board of Elections and our Maryland Attorney General's office. Now, we have widespread election tampering at the polls in this General Election taking the form of voting machines changing the voter's choices at the ballot box. Whether reversing the voter's selection on the ballot or eliminating the write-in choice of these voters completely......whether deliberately seeing that all but one voting machine out of several work causing huge lines of voters waiting in an effort to discourage these voters......the attack on free and fair elections in Maryland is systemic and must receive justice.
As a voter I personally experienced the scenario of having 4 of 5 voting machines down during what would be the busiest time for voters coming to the polls in the morning before work. I questioned the polling officials as to why these machines were down and how long it would take to bring them up as this was creating a condition of discouraging voters and within 5 minutes of making clear I was aware of these violations all voting machines were up and running, just minutes after being told that only one would be working. We hear on the news that polling places across Baltimore had the same problem of one machine in several operating with long lines to vote and it can be deduced that had someone made very public the intent to discourage voters at these polls as I did at mine----those machines would have been brought online. The candidates for whom I voted were the one's experiencing the effects of lost votes from polling machines flipping votes from one candidate to another and the effects of write-ins being erased.
We are demanding a hand recount of all ballots in Maryland and especially in the City of Baltimore. We demand that a citizen group be at every recount location and participate in seeing these ballots one by one and witness the counting of these ballots. I want to be assigned a leadership position in this in Baltimore City. This Maryland General Election cannot be called for Larry Hogan as from start to finish this election was systemically fraudulent and irregularities must be addressed in order to assure the citizens of Maryland they have had a Rule of Law free and fair election process. I am waiting for the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to rule on my original contest of the Democratic primary and will be heading to Federal Court when that decision comes. No election results can be certified until a complete audit of the entire state election sites is done.
Please respond with your plans to meet the demands of the citizens of Maryland united against widespread election fraud.
Thank you for your time,
Cindy Walsh
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This report is too long but it is a great look at hard work by the citizens of Maryland and what they found-----and if you look this report from 10 years ago it seems nothing has changed----except that the level of election fraud is growing and done openly now!
WHEN THE RIGHT TO VOTE GOES WRONG:Maryland Citizens Tell the Story of Election Day 2004“
It occurred to me later,” Ruth said, “that the incomplete tallies were not flagged, so how would anyone know that there were cards that could not be read in the pouches and which cards they were. I don’t know if the Board of Elections ever did upload these votes,” she added.-- Pollwatcher Ruth Zlotowitz relating her observations at a vote tabulation center in HowardCounty, on November 2, 2004.TrueVoteMDNovember 2004
TrueVoteMD is a non-partisan grassroots initiative that grew out of concerns raised by the introduction of paperless electronic touch-screen voting in Maryland. Its members representa broad spectrum of the community, including candidates for political office, elected officials,election judges, poll watchers, and citizens from all walks of life who are dedicated to preserving the integrity of our elections and ensuring confidence in the voting process.TrueVoteMD is a project of the Campaign for Fresh Air and Clean Politics, a Maryland non-profit (501(c)3 pending).This report was compiled and written by Linda Schade, Jillian Aldebron, and Amanda Bower
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We have candidates in Baltimore elections that have filed for a recount and audit.
MARYLAND STATUTES AND CODES Section 12-101 - Petition for recount. Listen § 12-101. Petition for recount.
(a) In general.- A candidate for public or party office who has been defeated based on the certified results of any election conducted under this article may petition for a recount of the votes cast for the office sought.
(b) Contents of petition for recount.- The petition shall specify that the recount be conducted:
(1) in all of the precincts in which the office was on the ballot; or
(2) only in the precincts designated in the petition.
(c) Place of filing.- The petition shall be filed with the board with which the candidate's certificate of candidacy was filed.
(d) Time of filing.- The petition must be filed within 3 days after the results of the election have been certified.
(e) Notice of filing of petition.-
(1) The State Board shall promptly notify each appropriate local board of a petition that is filed with the State Board.
(2) A local board shall promptly notify the State Board of a petition that is filed with the local board.
[An. Code 1957, art. 33, § 12-101; 2002, ch. 291, §§ 2, 4.]
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Below you see a good template for citizens conducting a public audit of an election in Baltimore City. We intend to witness an official recount if granted and see the actual ballots as they are counted. We will continue on with an audit regardless of the Maryland Board of Elections decision.
Report on Election Auditing by the Election Audits Task Force of the League of Women Voters of the United States
January 2009
Report on Election Auditing
Table of Contents
Introduction..........................................................3
Recommended Guidelines for Election Audits................................................................... 4
Guidelines for Auditing of Election Procedures and Processes.......................................... 5A.
Transparency .....................................5B.
Testing..................................................6C.
Physical Protection of Voting Systems ................................................................... 7D.
Education and Training........................................................8E.
Polling Place Procedures Prior to Voting................................................................ 9F.
Polling Place Procedures During Voting................................................................. 9
Guidelines for Conducting an Audit of Election Results.................................................. 10A.
In Advance of the Election.......................................................101.
Selecting Audit Units......................................................................................... 102.
“Risk Limiting” Audits and Statistical Considerations ..................................... 113.
Escalation Protocols........................................................................................... 12B.
After the Election ..............................................................131.
Basic Checks at All Polling Places .................................................................... 132.
Accounting for Provisional Ballots.................................................................... 133.
Approval or Disapproval of Provisional Ballots................................................ 134.
Accounting for Absentee Ballots ....................................................................... 135.
Starting and Completing Audits......................................................................... 146.
Using Paper Records.........................................................147.
Including All Ballots................................................................158.
Random Selection of Audit Units ......................................................................169.
Transparency.................................................... 1610.
Selective Audits ...................................... 1711.
Regulation of Audits ......................................... 1812.
Ballot Secrecy................................................... 1813.
Maintenance of Records .................................................................................. 18C.
How to Do the Audit Counting ............................................................................. 18D.
Reporting Guidelines................................ 201.
Audit Report............................................... 202.
Audit Results.............................................. 20
Criteria for an Election Auditing Law .............................................................................. 21A.
Process Audits............................................... 21B.
Post-Election Audits........................................ 21
Glossary of Election Audits Terminology ........................................................................ 24
Election Audits Resources .......................... 28A.
Reports ........................................................ 28B.
Post-Election Audits...................................... 28C.
Government Service Efforts and Performance Reports ........................................ 29D.
Sample Procedures for Hand Counting Ballots: ................................................... 29E.
Web Sites......................................... 29F.
Other Resources....................................30
©2009 League of Women Voters of the United States
Report on Election Auditing Report on Election Auditing
Introduction
A fair and accurate election process is essential to any democracy. After the 2000 election, in which voters experienced significant problems, many people came to doubt that the process was either fair or accurate. Consequently, significant changes in voting technology and in election laws and procedures were introduced. The results have been mixed. For example, numerous reputable reports have documented security, reliability and verifiability issues with electronic voting machines. Voters and advocates have questioned both the validity of specific election results and the integrity of the entire election process. Strengthening requirements for reviews of election procedures, testing voting equipment and auditing vote results can go a long way to restoring confidence in the fairness of the voting process and accuracy of election results. The field of election auditing is fairly new and evolving. About half of all states have laws or regulations and procedures relating to recounts of contested elections, and about one third of the states currently require election audits. Post-election audits differ from recounts. Post-election audits routinely check voting system performance in contests, regardless of how close margins of victory appear to be. Recounts repeat ballot counting in special circumstances, such as when preliminary results show a close margin of victory. Anyone designing an audit system should be fully cognizant of the relationship between audit and recount procedures. It is important that recount procedures and audit procedures complement each other, rather than duplicate or contradict each other. However, to distinguish these two important procedures in this document, we will strictly separate the use of the terms “audit,” “auditing,” “audit count” or “audit counting,” and “recount” or “recounting.”
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Maryland's election audit bills deserve support
by Rob Richie // Published February 20, 2009
This year the Maryland legislature is debating legislation (SB595 and HB665) that would require audits comparing paper ballots to machine count, promoting greater transparency throughout the election process. Casting of votes is a private act, but the counting of our votes should take place in full public view to ensure voter confidence in the results.Filed by Senate Majority Leader Edward Kasemeyer (D, Baltimore and Howard Counties) and House Ways and Means Chair Sheila Hixson (D, Montgomery County), thelegislation would require spot-checks of the new vote-counting equipment Maryland will begin using in 2010. The paper ballots marked by voters would be counted by hand in randomly selected precincts and the tallies compared to the results calculated by the optical scanning machines that will be used in the polling place.
Studies and Election Day experiences have proven most optical scanning equipment to be highly accurate in counting votes. In the recent Minnesota recount, for example, hand counts of the paper ballots showed that the optical scanners had an accuracy rate of 99.9%. But all computerized equipment is vulnerable to programming errors, equipment malfunctions, or misinterpretation of voter intent. As one example, a local race in Iowa in 2006 showed a stunning defeat of an incumbent by a little-known opponent until a hand-count of the paper ballots revealed a computer error in which the optical scanners had not been programmed to account for the rotating order in which candidates' names appeared on the ballots. Our new voting system will allow voters to know how their votes were recorded, but paper records do not mean much unless we use them to ensure that our votes are counted accurately, especially in close races.
The legislation would require audits of federal and statewide races using a method developed by statisticians to hand-count more votes in contests with a very narrow margin of victory than in those where the outcome is clearer. Many counties across the nation audit a flat percentage of ballots, but experts argue that this wastes time and resources counting races where the outcome is not in doubt while counting too few votes to be certain of correct results in a close race. Prominent organizations like the League of Women Voters and American Statistical Association endorse this approach.
A national group of prominent election officials, statisticians, computer statisticians and election reform advocates put their heads together to come up with the most practical and cost-effective way to ensure that election results are correct. In looking back at Maryland's last three general elections, the cost of auditing them this way would have been roughly $20,000 in 2004 and 2006 and almost $40,000 in 2008 because of the close race in Congressional District 1. That seems a small price to pay for ensuring voter confidence that the right candidate takes office.
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Citizen audits are organized all across the nation. Below you see a state that has a long history of citizen audits and we need that tradition in Maryland today.
Citizen Audit Seeks Connecticut Voters to Observe Post-Election Audits
Posted on August 9, 2014 | By Jonathan Kantrowitz
Source: The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit
Volunteer One Day for Democracy
The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit announces the opening of signup to participate in the independent observation of audits following the August primary election. Connecticut voters committed to trustworthy and credible elections are invited to signup now to volunteer one day between August 27th and September 12th.
Voters are offered written, video, and conference call training. Volunteers signup online, indicating the days within the period they can be available and the distance they are willing to travel. After towns are scheduled for audits, volunteers are assigned to observe one day in a town in their area of the state.
Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “Without our volunteers, only a few officials would know how post-election audits are conducted.”
Further information, an introductory video, and online signup are available at: http://CTElectionAudit.org/volunteer
After the completion of local counting, the Citizen Audit combines the official results with citizen observations and makes an independent report to the public, election officials, and the General Assembly.
The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit, has organized volunteer observers and provided independent post-election audit reports since the adoption of optical scanners statewide in 2007.
Weeks noted, “Our past reports have surfaced election day errors, and multiple flaws in the conduct of the audit itself. Without our observations and objective reports these errors would not have been surfaced or corrected.”
Information on the Citizen Audit and all past reports are all available at:
http://CTElectionAudit.org
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As you see below your Maryland Assembly has made it difficult for the citizens of Maryland to recount and/or audit elections because they use machines not offering a paper trail, they place the costs on the citizens requesting the recount with a bond requirement, and they do not have election audit laws. We can see an individual electronic ballot with no voter ID----but not a paper ballot for each voter. As I showed earlier, there is a history of problems in computer coding that has shown results can be changed.
Q: Does the new voting system have a paper trail?
A: Yes. Each voting unit prints a report before the polls open confirming that there are no votes on the voting unit. After the polls close, another report is printed showing the results from that voting unit. Additionally, in case of a recount, ballot images can be printed from the election database. These ballot images can be manually recounted without being attributable to any particular voter. The voting system does not, however, provide a voter-verified paper trail. The State Board of Elections conducted a study on voter-verified paper trail and other voter verification technologies. The findings of the study are that these solutions are not ready for implementation.
THIS WAS FROM A 2006 REPORT FROM MARYLAND ASSEMBLY STUDY ON VOTING MACHINES:
Finally, seven in ten respondents (69.4 percent) agreed that voters “should be able to confirm the votes they cast on touch screen systems by looking at paper records or receipts of their votes.” This should not be surprising, given people’s familiarity with receipts from self-service transactions (e.g., gas pumps, movie ticket kiosks, ATMs, etc.). Ask if anyone wants a receipt after any transaction, and the majority of persons will almost certainly say yes. No empirical data, of which I am aware, exist on the subject of receipt retention, use and management, and additional research in this area would be helpful. There is evidence from at least one election that most voters do not use the paper trail to verify their votes. In a video study of voters in Las Vegas in the 2004 general election, fewer than 40 percent actually looked at the paper trail to confirm their ballots and many of those voters merely glanced quickly, hit the confirm button and moved on (Los Angeles County, Registrar/Recorder, 2004).
Don't worry say the Maryland Assembly----we audit ourselves upon occasion.
Maryland Audit Information
In September 2013 the Maryland Board of Elections adopted new "verification" regulations: http://www.elections.state.md.us/laws_and_regs/documents/Proposed_Regulations.pdf
Note that while the term "audit" is used, because Maryland's voting machines don't produce a voter verifiable paper record, they are unable to conduct an audit that is an independent verification of the election day results (see audit definition here: http://www.ceimn.org/audit_database/about.)
Here are the key components:
1. Post election verification - checking that the totals from a sample of machines are added correctly to get the total.
2. Post election audit - Precincts - checking that the number of voters matches the number of votes (reconciliation.)
Additional Resources: Maryland Statutes - Title 8 - Elections Maryland State Board of Elections
Maryland Recount Laws
This information was initially released on October 21, 2010 and updated in October 2012.
Voting System Used: DREs without VVPAT
For more details, visit Verified Voting.
Counting Method: Electronic review only
Counting method chosen by initiator
While Maryland's statutes do not provide instructions for conducting recounts by hand or by machine, the Code of Maryland Regulations states that for votes cast on optical scan ballots, the recount initiator must specify the counting method to be used. See Title 33, “State Board of Elections,” Subtitle 12, “Recounts,” Chapter 5, “Recount Procedures – Optical Scan Voting System,” Section 33.12.05.02: http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/comarhtml/33/33.12.05.02.htm. However, optical scan ballots are used in Maryland primarily for absentee and provisional ballots. The primary voting system is direct-recording electronic machines (DREs) without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). Hence, despite these various recount provisions, in essence only an electronic review of the initial returns is possible. For recount procedures for DREs, see Subtitle 12, Chapter 6, “Recount Procedures – Direct Recording Equipment,” Section 33.12.06.02: http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/comarhtml/33/33.12.06.02.htm.
Initiating Mechanism: Candidate-initiated
Voter-initiated
Candidate-Initiated Options: Candidate determines how many/which precincts to recount
Any candidate in any election may petition for a recount. See the Maryland Statutes, “Election Law,” Section 12-101. If they do not specify all designated precincts, a counterpetition may be filed by another candidate to request that the remaining precincts also be recounted. Counterpetitions may also be filed to request an additional recount if the first recount alters the outcome of the election. See Section 12-102.
Timing: See Sections 12-101(d), 12-102 (d) and the Code of Maryland Regulations, Section 33.12.02.09: http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/getfile.aspx?file=33.12.02.09.htm.
Voter-Initiated Options: Voters determine how many/which precincts to recount
Voters may request recounts for initiatives/questions
Any voter may file a recount request for a question for which they are eligible to vote. As with recounts for candidates, the initiator may specify if all or only some precincts are to be recounted. See Section 12-103. If not all precincts are requested, a counterpetition may be filed requesting that the remaining precincts also be recounted. See Section 12-104.
Timing: See Sections 12-103(D) and 12-104(D).
Cost for Candidate-Initiated Recounts: Initiator pays deposit or bond before recount
Payer of costs depends on outcome of recount
Costs are not determined beforehand, but a bond is set by a judge after the recount petition is filed. See Section 12-105. There are a number of outcomes that can result in the state paying the full costs of the recount, including a change in the election result or a substantial gain in votes for the requesting candidate. See Section 12-107.
Cost for Voter-Initiated Recounts: Initiator pays deposit or bond before recount
Payer of costs depends on outcome of recount
Costs are not determined beforehand, but a bond is set by a judge after the recount petition is filed. See Section 12-105. There are a number of outcomes that can result in the state paying the full costs of the recount, including a change in the election result or a substantial gain in votes in favor of the position taken on the question by the initiator. See Section 12-107.
Challengers and Observers: Statutes specify that recount must be public
Party/candidate or initiator has statutory authority to appoint observers
Party/candidate or initiator has statutory authority to appoint challengers
Election officials are required to “ensure the public’s ability to be present while the recount is conducted.” See Section 12-106(a)(2). While the statutes do not mention observers or challengers, the Code of Maryland Regulations provides rules by which “any person with standing to file a petition for the recount being conducted” may challenge votes or ballots in the recount. See Section 33.12.07, “Challenges”: http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/SubtitleSearch.aspx?search=33.12.07. The Code also specifies that recounts shall be “open to candidates and their representatives, other parties to the recount, the media, and the general public.” See Section 33.12.03.02: http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/getfile.aspx?file=33.12.03.02.htm.
Rules for Determining Voter Intent: Secretary of State or Election Board responsible for defining intent
The State Board is to adopt regulations regarding voter intent. See Section 11-302.
Audit Laws: State does not have audit laws
As of our most recent update (October 2012), Maryland does not have audit laws.
Additional Resources: Maryland Statutes - Title 8 - Elections Maryland State Board of Elections
States having: The primary voting system is direct-recording electronic machines (DREs) without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).