a person who is free; a person who enjoys personal, civil, or political liberty. a person who enjoys or is entitled to citizenship, franchise, or other special privilege: a freeman of a city'.
We are discussing US COURT public policy throwing in RELIGIOUS policy as well since our religions are supposedly the source of SOCIAL JUSTICE.
We chose this one military court case to show what considerations need to occur as we move a LAWSUIT against SEXUAL ASSAULT forward in CIVILIAN COURTS. This ranking military leader MCKINNEY convicted a few decades ago is typical ------he is not the exception; these cases come from black, white, and brown military staff.
As we said yesterday----the military court in WASH DC district is most conservative because it is tied to PENTAGON-------taking a sexual crime to court needs a court jurisdiction with less military attachment.
'COPING WITH INVASIONS:
'bridle and halter'
Use barbarians to attack barbarians
Use barbarians to control barbarians
Turn barbarians into CHINESE
Reconciliation and intimacy: marriage alliance
Recognized Chinese strategies for border management'
In MCKINNEY'S court case the conviction filled with sexual crime accusations convicted on OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. In the ABU GHRAIB sexual torture military convictions-----GRANER was convicted for CONSPIRACY---ASSAULT-----COMMITTING INDECENT ACTS.
Indecent acts can be as simple as SEXUAL HARASSMENT by a NOSY NEIGHBOR or by staff in an institution. Easy to convict so often included in cases of SEXUAL ASSAULTS AND HARASSMENT.
'Army reservist Lynndie England, 22, had faced 19 charges of abuse and indecent acts which could have put her behind bars for 38 years.
Graner is charged with conspiracy to maltreat detainees, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of detainees, assaulting detainees, indecent acts, adultery and obstruction of justice'.
Aug 21, 2018
Jun 14, 2017
Obstruction of Justice
Obstruction of justice is a criminal charge that is used to bring down politicians and other public officials—elected or appointed—who have knowingly attempted to disrupt criminal proceedings or otherwise interfere with the workings of the criminal justice system. Obstruction statutes were put in place to punish politicians and other powerful public officials who lie or attempt to “cheat the system,” and to prevent those transgressions from occurring. And, for the most part, they work, too.
What Is Obstruction of Justice?
Simply put, obstruction of justice is defined as the offense of interfering with the administration or process of law in a criminal or civil matter; withholding key information or information; giving false testimony; or harming or intimidating a juror, witness, law enforcement officer or other official.
The charge may also be brought against a person found to have altered and/or destroyed physical evidence, even if he or she was under no legal obligation to produce the evidence. Finally, a person charged with obstruction of justice may also be involved in attempts to hinder the identification, arrest, conviction or sentencing of a criminal.
Very often, a charge of obstruction is paired with other, more serious offenses such as bribery, murder or the use of physical force against witnesses, law enforcement officers or court officials, as these acts are often part of the process of obstruction.
Typically, those guilty of obstruction perform these criminal acts with the intent of influencing, delaying or preventing a criminal investigation (involving themselves or a close associate) or of influencing, delaying or preventing court testimony or the presentation of evidence in a legal proceeding.
Essentially, obstruction of justice laws exist at the federal, state and local levels to protect the integrity of legal proceedings and those individuals who participate in them.
Who Obstructs Justice?
Anyone who interferes with a criminal investigation, or a criminal or civil trial, can be charged with obstruction of justice. However, its use as a criminal charge made against public officials—judges, prosecutors, attorneys general and elected officials—is arguably more well known.
In fact, the phrase will often be used in connection with charges of corruption against elected officials—particularly mayors and city council members at the local level, governors and state legislators at the state level, and the president and members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives at the federal level—whether these cases are under investigation or have been taken to trial.
Notably, public officials may face obstruction of justice charges if they are found to have lied to investigators in a criminal inquiry, even in cases in which they were not suspects.
It was clear MCKINNEY as is true of NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG use FEAR AND INTIMIDATION------they use power over victims. In MCKINNEY'S case he used MILITARY RANK----in case of NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG they use the difficulty of proving cameras and microphones are illegal capturing images and voice inside of victim's living space. They are SO CONFIDENT the evidence needed to prove the crimes of black market illegal streaming video PORN will not be found. We can bet there is a LOT of threats and intimidation keeping anyone tied to a NOSY NEIGHBOR AND THE GANG network from coming forward with these PROOFS/EVIDENCE.
(6)Threatening or placing that other person in fear.--
The term “threatening or placing that other person in fear” means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another person being subjected to the wrongful action contemplated by the communication or action.
This is what MCKINNEY was counting on as he used RANK to threaten and make fearful anyone who could provide EVIDENCE of his SEXUAL CRIMES.
This article shows the US COURT vs MILITARY COURT where MCKINNEY sought to reverse that ONE CONVICTION trying to consider using CIVIL COURT vs MILITARY COURT. MILITARY COURT decides there would be no difference and upheld conviction.
This court was the WASH DC MILITARY COURT-----and the civil court was US COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG FOR SEVERAL MONTHS OF LETTING ME KNOW I WAS BEING ILLEGALLY SURVEILLED AND MADE PORN-----OPENLY USED 'THREATENING OR PLACING THAT PERSON IN FEAR'
McKINNEY v. WHITE
Reset A A Font size: Print United States Court of Appeals,District of Columbia Circuit.
Gene C. McKINNEY, Appellant, v. Thomas A. WHITE, Secretary of the Army, and W. B. Huffman, Major General, The Judge Advocate General, Appellees.
No. 01-5172.Decided: June 07, 2002
Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges. Charles W. Gittins argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Thomas M. Ray, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.Gene C. McKinney, now retired, was a Sergeant Major of the Army who was court martialed in 1998 and found guilty of obstructing justice in violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), 10 U.S.C. § 934. After unsuccessful attempts to have his conviction set aside under the UCMJ, he sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, of the Judge Advocate General's denial of his request to set aside the court martial finding and sentence. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Judge Advocate General is not an “ agency” for purposes of the APA. We hold that the statutory scheme created by Congress for review of courts martial precludes review of the Judge Advocate General's decision under the APA. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Pursuant to UCMJ Article 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832, an Army investigation of allegations of sexual harassment and assault by six female military personnel resulted in McKinney's being court martialed. He was charged in 18 counts with violations of military law arising out of alleged sexual harassment and in a separate count with obstruction of justice in violation of UCMJ Article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934. In March 1998, a jury acquitted him of the 18 sexual harassment counts and convicted him of the obstruction count. He was sentenced to a reprimand and a reduction in grade from Army Sergeant Major to Army Master Sergeant.
McKinney sought a post-trial evidentiary hearing pursuant to UCMJ Article 39(a), 10 U.S.C. § 839(b), to inquire into allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in not disclosing and destroying evidence and attempting to influence witnesses. The Military Trial Judge denied the motion on the papers. The Judge also denied McKinney's renewed Article 39(a) request, to which he had attached the affidavit of his counsel recounting a discussion with a prosecution witness.
McKinney then filed a petition for mandamus in the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals in a further effort to obtain a post-trial evidentiary hearing; the court denied the petition. His writ of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces was also denied, without prejudice to his right of review under UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869. McKinney v. United States, 51 M.J. 270 (C.A.A.F.1998).
Pursuant to UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869(a), the Commander for the Military District of Washington affirmed the findings and sentence and forwarded the record of the trial to the Judge Advocate General for review. Following an investigation of McKinney's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct that included interviews of several prosecution witnesses, including the witness referred to in McKinney's Article 39(a) affidavit, the Judge Advocate General stated summarily: “The finding and sentence are supported in law and the sentence is appropriate. No modification of the finding or sentence is warranted.” The Judge Advocate General did not refer the case to a Court of Criminal Appeals for review as to matters of law. Id. § 869(d) & (e).
Having failed to obtain relief from the military justice system, McKinney filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. He alleged that the decision of the Judge Advocate General was arbitrary and capricious and not based on substantial evidence within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, because the Judge Advocate General failed to provide an adequate explanation for rejecting McKinney's claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The Secretary of the Army and the other defendants (“the Secretary”) moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Judge Advocate General is not an “agency” for purposes of the APA.
McKinney contends that the district court erred in ruling that the Judge Advocate General's decision is not subject to review under the APA. He maintains that because decisions by the Judge Advocate General under UCMJ Article 69 are reached independently and constitute final binding decisions affecting the rights of individuals, the Judge Advocate General is an “authority” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) whose decisions are subject to judicial review under the APA as final agency action. He relies on the broad definition of the word “agency” in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1), and the presumption favoring review of final agency decisions that is overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to restrict access to the courts. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511-12, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).
Although the district court addressed McKinney's complaint in terms of whether the Judge Advocate General was an “agency” subject to APA review, we conclude that a threshold jurisdictional issue must be addressed. The APA provides for the non-reviewability of “courts martial and military commissions,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(F), but does not expressly preclude review of Judge Advocate General decisions reviewing courts martial pursuant to UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869. Congress' establishment, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, of a separate judicial system for courts martial review is, however, convincing evidence that Congress could not have intended Judge Advocate General review of courts martial to fall within APA review of agency decisions.
In Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 1307, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that it “repeatedly has recognized that of necessity ‘(m)ilitary law ․ is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law that governs in our federal judicial establishment.’ ” 420 U.S. at 746, 95 S.Ct. at 1307 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047-48, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953)). The Court also reiterated in Schlesinger both the general rule that “the acts of a court martial, within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in the civil courts, by writ of prohibition or otherwise,” 420 U.S. at 746, 95 S.Ct. at 1307 (citations omitted), and the limited exception for collateral attack seeking a declaration that a judgment is void, having no res judicata effect, “because of lack of jurisdiction or some other equally fundamental defect.” Id. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1307. Observing that “[t]he military is ‘a specialized society separate from civilian society’ with ‘laws and traditions of its own (developed) during its long history,’ ” id. at 757, 95 S.Ct. at 1313 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2555, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)), the Court noted that “Congress attempted to balance ․ military necessities against the equally significant interest of ensuring fairness to servicemen charged with military offenses.” Id. The Court further observed that:
implicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the [UCMJ] is the view that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will perform its assigned task. We think this congressional judgment must be respected and that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights.
Id. at 758, 94 S.Ct. at 2562-63.
As the proceedings in McKinney's case illustrate, Congress has established a complete and distinct procedure for members of the military who are charged with law violations under the UCMJ. While direct parallels are imprecise, the proceedings in his case suggest a process that begins with a review that serves a function comparable to that of the grand jury for Article III courts. This was followed by a jury trial, imposition of a sentence, and post-trial motions proceedings. Then, in a procedure unique to the military, the finding and sentence were subject to the approval of the Commander of the Military District. 10 U.S.C. § 860. Upon such approval, the trial record was forwarded, in light of the length of McKinney's sentence, to the Judge Advocate General for review instead of a Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. §§ 866(b)(1), 869(a). UCMJ Article 69 provides that a soldier who is convicted during a general court martial and sentenced to less than one year of confinement is entitled to an automatic review of the record of the trial by the Judge Advocate General, unless the soldier affirmatively waives review. Id. § 869. “If any part of the findings or sentence is found to be unsupported in law or if reassessment of the sentence is appropriate, the Judge Advocate General may modify or set aside the findings or sentence or both.” Id. § 869(a). Upon referral by the Judge Advocate General, further review of questions of law is available by a Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869. UCMJ Article 76 provides that:
[t]he appellate review of records of trial provided by [Chapter 47, UCMJ] ․ are final and conclusive․ [and] are binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States, subject only to action upon a petition for a new trial as provided in section 837 of this title (article 73) and to action by the Secretary concerned as provided in section 847 of this title (article 74) [Remission and suspension], and the authority of the President.
Id. § 876.
The proceedings under the UCMJ demonstrate that the designated reviewing authorities have “heard [McKinney] out on every significant allegation which [he] now urge[s].” Burns, 346 U.S. at 144, 73 S.Ct. at 1050. The Military Trial Judge reviewed McKinney's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on two occasions and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied his writ of appeal. The Judge Advocate General reviewed the court martial finding and sentence and also conducted his own investigation into the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.
McKinney makes no claim that the procedures established by Congress in the UCMJ were inadequate to the task, much less “fundamentally defect[ive].” Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1307-08.
This court has long acknowledged that it lacks jurisdiction of a direct appeal of a court martial.
Although McKinney does not seek review of a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, he, like the petitioners in Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C.Cir.1954), seeks review of a decision by the military authority that Congress has designated to review his direct appeal and his collateral attack on his general court martial conviction. The fact that he did not receive a more severe sentence, whereby his appeal would have gone to a Court of Criminal Appeals, is a distinction without difference with regard to the jurisdiction of this court. As in Shaw, then, “we are clear” that Congress has not granted jurisdiction to this court to review direct appeals from the highest military official of a general court martial. 209 F.2d at 812-13.
Furthermore, Congress has expressly provided that “courts martial” are not subject to review under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(F). While McKinney contends that this prohibition does not extend to the final decision of the Judge Advocate General, the logic of his position is illusive. Congress has provided a separate justice system in the UCMJ for military personnel and it has expressly determined that “courts martial” are not to be subject to APA review.
Hence, it is difficult to understand the reasoning that Congress would have utilized in making the final UCMJ review of “courts martial” subject to review by Article III courts under the APA. To adopt that position would not only be contrary to the long-established understanding that “[m]ilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment,” Burns, 346 U.S. at 140, 73 S.Ct. at 1047, “[i]t is well settled that ‘by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court martial’ ” and that “[t]he correction of any errors it may have committed is for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review its decision.” Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111, 70 S.Ct. 495, 499, 94 L.Ed. 691 (1950) (citations omitted). In Shaw, this court rejected the view that the Court of Military Appeals (now the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces), was anything other than “a court in every significant respect, rather than an administrative agency.” 209 F.2d at 813. Although the Judge Advocate General has independent fact-finding authority under UCMJ Article 69, unlike a Court of Criminal Appeals under UCMJ Article 66 or an Article III appellate court, McKinney points to nothing that would indicate that Congress viewed the UCMJ Article 69 procedures for review of courts martial involving sentences of less than one year to be so inferior as to warrant review by Article III courts under the APA.
Although review by the Judge Advocate General is in the nature of a collateral proceeding akin to coram nobis, Curci v. United States, 577 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir.1978) (citing inter alia S.Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 4501, 4515), for the military justice system where “Congress has taken great care both to define the rights of those subject to military law [ ] [and to] provide a complete system of review within the military system to secure those rights,” Burns, 346 U.S. at 140, 73 S.Ct. at 1048, the Judge Advocate General's decision is properly viewed as what Congress concluded should be the final decision under military law in McKinney's court martial. So understood, Congress' preclusion of APA review of “courts martial” reaches the Judge Advocate General's decision in McKinney's case.
Although McKinney contends only that the Judge Advocate General's summary statement of his decision is inadequate to reveal the basis of his reasoning, and arguably is not seeking review of the underlying court martial finding that he obstructed justice in violation of UCMJ Article 134, by assuming jurisdiction in his case the court would be unable to deny review in later cases where it would be required to review courts martial findings. As framed, moreover, McKinney's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct would effectively require this court to determine whether the alleged misconduct so affected his court martial that he was denied a fair trial. Cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-79, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381-82, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3108-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987). Yet this is the type of question that Congress has determined is to be conducted by the Judge Advocate General when a court martial sentence imposes less than one year's confinement. See Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 746-47, 95 S.Ct. at 1307-08. Moreover, as the Second Circuit has suggested, the Judge Advocate General's decision to use a short form of response in claims seeking discretionary review is not unexpected where there are a large number of claims. See Curci, 577 F.2d at 818. McKinney's attempt to invoke the APA amounts, then, to an attempt to end run a military justice system wherein Congress has afforded him the direct review procedures it deemed appropriate.
Accordingly, we hold that this court has no jurisdiction under the APA to review the decision of the Judge Advocate General denying McKinney's request to set aside the court martial finding and sentence, and we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
When looking for lawyers for either CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS----or like me ---private NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG lawsuits look to those DEFENSES having won against SEX CRIMES to understand how to build an OFFENSE against what these defense lawyer bring forward.
NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG have spent these several years of HITTING ME AND MAKING ME PORN creating videos and dubbing making me appear to be a BAD PERSON when in fact I am a very good person. Lot's of people will come forward and say----NO ONE LIKES HER------but, character analysis goes beyond GROUP SPEAK AND CHATTER. Presenting RIGGED IDENTITY THEFT evidence of character WILL FAIL.
HOSTING SERVER NOSY NEIGHBORS may intimidate people to give character assessment that are not REAL ----but, swearing under oath makes people think twice.
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY provided a lawyer who likes to defend people guilty of SEXUAL CRIMES.
Born1956 (age 62–63)
United States Marine Corps
Years of service1976-1995
Lawyer who specializes in military cases
Charles Gittins is an American lawyer, who was worked for a number of noteworthy defendants in military courts martial.
Gittins attended the United States Naval Academy, graduating in 1979. He then joined the Marine Corps where he served as a Radar Intercept Officer.
Gittins graduated first in his class from The Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law in 1987 and was in the Judge Advocate Corps for six years, before entering civilian life. The first civilian firm Gittins worked for was Williams & Connolly. While there he defended Robert E. Stumpf, Commander of the Blue Angels, and one of the principals in the Tailhook scandal. He spent three and a half years there before founding his own firm.
'Specialist Charles Graner Military Police reservist involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal'.
"He was honored by the service with an invitation to go to law school at the expensive of the Government. He graduated first in his class at Catholic University."
Being aware of LAWYERS tied to working DEFENSE for SEXUAL CRIMES and cases won and lost is a must. The military trials of both MCKINNEY and ABU GHRAIB GRANER were handled by GITTINS who was NOT SUCCESSFUL with GRANER ----but was with MCKINNEY.
HAVE YOU BEEN ACCUSED OF:
Sexual assault refers to unwanted or non-consensual sexual contact such as grabbing or groping but excluding actual intercourse. In some states, sexual assault is referred to as Rape, Sexual Abuse or Sexual Battery.
Depending on the severity of the victim’s allegations, sexual assault can be classified as a felony. The risk exposure and severity of the penalties are largely dependent on the victim’s claims, pre-trial preparation is vital.
There are rarely eyewitnesses, and these are typically “he said, she said” cases, so thorough investigation is a must.
Credibility can be a key point, and expert witnesses are often a useful tool that can tip the scales toward the defense.
The mere accusation of sexual assault can have a devastating effect on your life, including serious harm to your reputation, career and personal relationships. A sexual assault conviction can follow you for the rest of your life. If convicted, you can face a lifetime registration as a sex offender and severe criminal penalties. Regardless of the severity or circumstances of your offense, your sex offender registration becomes public record, and your neighbors and employers will be able to see this identification for the rest of your life.
RECENT WINS IN SEX CASES:
- Experienced kids tattoo artist gets charged with 2 counts of child molestation at hotel where he was working. Client was facing Life in Prison. After substantial work by our team including experts and other defense resources, we were able to negotiate an amazing result of Probation and immediate release from Jail!
- Decorated Air Force officer charged with Rape! Client was facing 30 years in Prison and would have been registered as a sex offender. Our client would have lost everything from a distinguished 20-year career in the military to all his benefits and any future jobs. He even would have been limited on where he could live. Our team of attorneys put together a solid and aggressive defense, with experts and private investigators along with other critical resources to prove our client’s innocence. We took the case to trial and we won! Not Guilty on all counts!
MORE RECENT TOP WINS!
DEFENSE FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT
Sexual assault cases generally pit the word of the accused against the word of the victim. Physical evidence may be available immediately after the alleged act. This evidence can be used to your defense if you obtain an effective defense team immediately.
Sexual defense is different from other areas of criminal law and requires very specific techniques and experience. An effective defense team often employs psychologists, computer forensic examiners, private investigators and a Los Angeles sex crime attorney with the expertise to use these tools in the most effective manner.
LibertyBell Law Group was founded by a group of top criminal lawyers who have a track record of winning pleas and cases. Our attorneys grew frustrated with the fact that thousands of people suffer life-altering consequences because they do not have the ability to mount an adequate defense.
Our lawyers united to level the playing field. We hand-picked only the foremost attorneys in sexual assault defense. Our lawyers have extensive experience in sensitive and highly challenging sexual assault cases.
We provide these legal veterans with all of the resources they need to get the best possible ending on your case. Our powerful legal defense force of the best attorneys are available and affordable for you.
This structure of NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG is very tied to the use of military style equipment for surveillance and recruits THE GANG from any number of resources BUT we can imagine that the GLOBAL SEX TRADE tied to global military corporations may have those NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG sources.
Below we see 11 FORMER MEMBERS of this MARYLAND MILITARY POLICE UNIT were charged and found guilty. When my case of SATURATED NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG with OPEN SECRET illegal surveillance video and PORN hits THE PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE NETWORK supposedly controlled by HOMELAND SECURITY----we see where MARYLAND AND BALTIMORE has a history of SEXUAL VIOLENCE.
We shared an article that stated as much with our BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT which has been sited by US JUSTICE DEPARTMENT for ignoring SEXUAL CRIMES.
'Much of the defense testimony during sentencing focused on her behavior while in Hillah, Iraq, where the Maryland-based 372nd Military Police Company was stationed for several months before moving to Abu Ghraib'.
'The 372nd Military Police Company is a law enforcement unit within the U.S. Army Reserve. The unit is based out of Cresaptown, Maryland. Eleven former members of this unit were charged and found guilty in the Abu Ghraib scandal'.
Without giving a NAME------we find that one of these ABU GHRAIB staff was hired by BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT working as community policing. We want our VETS to be employed but COMMON SENSE tells us that military tied to such VIOLENT assignments should not be recruited for our public policing.
WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO IN BALTIMORE REGARDING THIS ABSOLUTE SATURATION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND CRIMES.
POLITICAL REVENGE PORN by NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG-----the people HIT are only ENEMIES.
Protecting BAD APPLES tends to occur in all industry FRATERNITIES----our doctors are famous for that.
372ND MILITARY POLICE COMPANY (UNITED STATES ARMY)
Posted on November 20, 2017 by idraintheswamp
Source: Newspapers Library
372nd MP Company Coming Home To Western Md.
April 30, 2011 at 1:24 pm
CRESAPTOWN, Md. (AP) — The Army says the 372nd Military Police Company is on its way home to western Maryland from a yearlong deployment in Afghanistan.
The reservists are expected to arrive around 3 p.m. Saturday at the U.S. Army Reserve Center south of Cumberland near Cresaptown.
Company commander Capt. Frederick Wasser Jr. says the unit suffered no fatalities and did an excellent job.
He says several members were awarded bronze stars and Army commendation medals for meritorious and distinguished service.
Eight received the Army combat action badge.
Bringing RELIGIOUS public policy into this discussion of US COURTS and SEXUAL CRIMES is appropriate because our religions have central in any CREED to protect the virtue of women, children, and families.
We are watching as RELIGIOUS people are sold as becoming POLITICIANS-----when RELIGIOUS people would not be associated with today's MASS CRIMINALITY AND CORRUPTION---all that LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING---NO MORALS OR ETHICS.
Where we NEED religious people and leaders is US COURTS ------social justice happens in COURTS. The fact that the US cannot seem to set criminal COURT PRECEDENCE for SEXUAL ASSAULTS both physical and non-contact means our RELIGIOUS people and leaders are not ENFORCING GOD'S NATURAL LAWS.
How prevalent was sex between slaveowners and slaves in ...www.quora.com/How-prevalent-was-sex-between...It was very nearly universal. Most slave owners had no one and nothing to prevent them using their slaves-male and female- for sexual purposes, and would not have believed any one who told them it was wrong.
What I hear on THE NETWORK thinking it is mostly NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG is this effort to create IDENTITY THEFT against me as THE VICTIM framing a FALLEN WOMAN picture by a group of people WHO ARE CRIMINALS AND BLACK MARKET SEX TRADE PORN MULES.
a person who is free; a person who enjoys personal, civil, or political liberty. a person who enjoys or is entitled to citizenship, franchise, or other special privilege: a freeman of a city'.
The DEFENSE LAWYERS for SEX CRIMES always create this MYTH-MAKING and I know I have some LAWYER NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG.
Looking at colonial MARYLAND and its religions----we discussed how ANGLICAN AND CATHOLIC as well as ANABAPTIST et al were active in the framework leading to MARYLAND as a SOVEREIGN STATE in a SOVEREIGN nation of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
We emphasize again-----MOVING FORWARD FINAL SOLUTION bringing US to colonial status will not look like that colonialism 400 years ago. There will be no MIDDLE CLASS ---there will only be global 1% and the 2% with the rest being SLAVES/SERVILE with FREEMAN/WOMEN seen as people to be USED.
Palatinates were not, however, confined to the Old World:
In America, besides Maryland, there were Avalon,
Georgia, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.
People and Life of Colonial Maryland:
HE early settlers of Maryland were divided as follows:
the upper and middle classes,
composed of planters, farmers, and merchants,
the poor whites and freedmen, and the servile class.
So, here in Baltimore NOSY NEIGHBORS AND THE GANG are openly allowed to PRETEND the victim of these illegal surveillance and PORN crimes are SLAVES---SEX SLAVES to bring back these COLONIAL MARYLAND religious stances.
This article does a good job in giving a picture of COLONIAL AMERICA and its SEX views. Remember, 400 years ago the people sent to America were largely indentured or enslaved and the voyage so arduous kept the number of women low and SURVIVAL trumping FAMILY MAKING so, women made SEXUAL PERFORMERS was more likely then needed TODAY.
Doing the Nasty in Colonial America
June 30, 2007, 3:56 pm
So many people are coming to this one on Google that I thought I’d add some citations in case they are moved to go read more about this subject.
Lots of historians write about sex. Richard Godbeer’s Sexual Revolution in Early America
is as good as any place to start (and better than most). He also has written a number of shorter articles on non-procreative sex that you can find in the William and Mary Quarterly.
Merrill Smith’s Sex and Sexuality in Early America — a collection of articles, good for a short sampling — is also good, though it doesn’t aim to be a narrative history but rather a bunch of case studies. I also think highly of the work of Sharon Block, whose book
Rape and Sexual Power in Early America is really terrific.
Block and Kathleen Brown edited an entire volume of William and Mary Quarterly in January 2003 and the authors of those articles are now coming out with great and relevant books. You might also want to look for anything by Martha Hodes, Jennifer Spears, or Kirsten Fischer — excellent authors with excellent books and articles that concern themselves with how sexual and racial hierarchy is built up together in imperial settings like colonial America and the early US South. Finally, I’d be amiss if I let you get away without a mention of Clare Lyons book about sex in colonial Philadelpia, titled
Sex among the Rabble: An Intimate History of Gender and Power in the Age of Revolution, Philadelphia, 1780-1830.
The premarital pregnancy stuff I talk about is condensed from a classic in the field by Daniel Scott Smith and Michael Hindus, “Premarital Pregnancy in America, 1640-1971: An Overview and Interpretation,” _Journal of Interdisciplinary History_ 5 (1974-5). The general text in the field that covers a lot of ground, but in my mind is interpretively sort of out of date, is John d’Emilio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America. Likewise, while I like Stephanie Coontz, _The Social Origins of Private Life: A History of American Families 1600-1900, it was written twenty years ago and some of what she wrote then has been modified by the findings of the more recent works listed above. Hope this helps.
This one is for Nick, who appears to be incapable of asking easy questions. (That is, of course, a good thing. Any other historian who wants to jump in on this, feel free…I haven’t even touched on the whole trans-Atlantic dimension of this…)
“I have a very curious nature, and I have a nagging history question today, a question about women in the revolutionary era. Why were there way more prostitutes in colonial America than today? From everything I’ve read, they were ubiquitous back then (like in some towns, the vast majority of women). Are we actually way more puritanical now than we were then?”
First, prostitutes were never the vast majority of women in colonial America. Women is a pretty big category, encompassing married, widowed, single women — black, white, Indian women — rich and poor and middling women. If we restrict ourselves to white women (just temporarily), the vast majority of white women followed the standard marriage and kids route, then as now. Most black women did not own themselves and thus could not sell themselves. And Indian women’s use of sexual exchange was really different in its meaning (depending on who and when you’re talking about) than Anglo prostitution. Also, the total colonial population was a tiny fraction of today’s mainland US population, so as a matter of numbers, it would be very unlikely that there are more prostitutes then than now. So, with that misconception cleared up, let’s talk about sex in colonial America…
Yes, strange as it may seem, American society is much more sexually uptight than it was in the 18th century, the pornification of everything notwithstanding. Colonial Americans were a sexually open bunch — they cracked dirty jokes, they played sexual pranks, they sang outrageously ribald songs, they drew scandalous cartoons, and they masturbated in the churchyard when they thought the sermon was boring. They spied on each other through the cracks in the cabin walls, they had sex in haylofts, and they told everybody they knew when they got laid. There was no expectation of privacy.
Even the Puritans, who are usually thought of as the world’s greatest prudes, believed that sex was a positive good within marriage and that sexual satisfaction was pleasing in the eyes of God.
So this was a lusty bunch of folks, well-lubricated with alcohol, cider, and small beer…
There. There’s one straightforward answer. Now, about prostitution…
The motives for regulating sexual behavior were different from colony to colony, so it’s hard to speak generally about sexual policing. Some colonies spent a lot of energy policing interracial sex — trying to keep the line bright between owners and the owned. Other colonies were far more concerned about offenses to social order and supporting the patriarchal household head’s right to control the bodies and labor of his dependents. All colonies and localities cared about sexual relationships in which live birth resulted, as they wanted fathers to acknowledge paternity and support the infant/mother pair until the child was old enough to be weaned and be bound out (OR marry, if possible) — the motive there is to avoid putting a mother/child on the pauper rolls, which was a public charge. Ownership of one’s body and the right to sell one’s labor (including sexual labor) is a property issue that is connected with a lot of other things, including race, the law of coverture, and the changing nature of scientific inquiry. So it’s a really complicated thing to try to break out one small piece of the non-marital sex puzzle when maybe it would be easier to understand if we approached it more holistically. Stick with me and you’ll learn something, though we’re not going to take the HOV lane.
Generally speaking, colonial Americans divided sexual acts into procreative and nonprocreative activity. They were always more down on nonprocreative sex.
Beastiality was always out — there was still an imprecise understanding of reproduction and a fear of the creation of “abominable” half-human monsters, as well as the violation of someone else’s chattel (a cow, horse, sheep, or dog that didn’t belong to the penetrator).
Repeated acts of sodomy that became public knowledge, violated other social boundaries (like when an elite man buggered an unwilling servant boy and the boy’s parents got into the act), or betokened an ongoing “unnatural” partnership (two men living together and not motivating themselves to find wives) would be punished, but not nearly as frequently or as harshly as you might think. Tribadic activity or female “sporting” is rarely mentioned in colonial court records and was always given the stinkeye when it came to public notice. Public masturbation — especially in the churchlot, the courthouse steps, or other places where it was meant to give offense to the dignity of the activities that occurred in that location — was out. Transgendered performance — especially men wearing women’s clothing, but even to a lesser extent women passing for men — violated social order by pretending to be something that you weren’t. (But there are those that argue that you’d have been in similar trouble for counterfeiting a cross-class appearance…)
So, let’s think about procreative (heterosexual, penetrative, penis in or near vagina) sex. Sex between married people, of course, was presumed good and sexual capacity was considered vital to being legally married. If a man contracted marriage but could not achieve or maintain an erection, for example, that was cause for a separation in Massachusetts Bay Colony. And if a woman was barren, that was not necessarily “her fault” — it could indicate that her husband was a bad lover, as it was commonly believed that women needed to climax to “catch” a baby.
Premarital sex, though…that’s a can of worms. There’s a lot of different ideas about women and premarital sex in colonial America, depending on where one was geographically, one’s social class and race, what’s one’s relationship was to one’s partner, etc. According to one early study of sexuality in New England, it was not all that uncommon for couples to be expecting babies when they married — premarital sex between partners who had declared their intention to marry, while not exactly embraced by society, was also not stigmatized.
That’s what happened when bundling got a little hot and heavy. In southern colonies, however, free white girls’ sexual “purity” was a badge of white male honor in a slaveholding society, with sexual activity heavily stigmatized and associated with the lower sort and/or indentured servitude. (The enduring association is found, for example, in the word “slut” — which is another word for a dirty kitchen menial.) Sexual access to enslaved women was presumed a part of a master’s ownership of their bodies. The strong presumption of coercion makes a consideration of sex between white indentured serving women or enslaved black women and their masters something different than prostitution.
So, why does it seem like there’s so many whores in colonial America? I’ve got some ideas.
1) Social conditions. Endemic warfare in the 18th c created displaced refugees (mostly women and kids) who contributed to urban overcrowding (people are living 9-12 persons per room). The economy tanked in mid-century and the gap between rich and poor got much wider, especially in coastal cities. These port towns had a lot of women without any regular source of income (as their husbands might be sailors in the China trade, gone for two years at a time). And there weren’t a whole lot of jobs for women outside of services related to one’s domestic skills — laundry, keeping boarders, baking bread, making beer, sewing buttons, upholstering or tending bar or maybe offering a dame’s school. So, lacking other means of keeping themselves alive and generating extra income, women might find what we’d now call a sugar daddy to help pay the bills. Or a woman might honestly not know if her husband was alive or coming back — self-divorce being common — and “take up” with another man. Or she might sell a bit on the side, to make rent, without any intention of pursuing sex as a trade. None of these things would have been considered particularly whorish at the time. Our standards have changed and we’d be inclined to categorize all of these behaviors as prostitution.
2. Young women could be accused of bawdry (gossip and slander being major sports in colonial America) without a shred of evidence and slurs against sexual chastity were common — as they both shamed the girl and they shamed the father, who was not exercising appropriate patriarchal control over his daughter’s body. Many girls were called whores (by other women, mostly) or accused of being “poxy” or “crusted” (yeah…euuuuuuuuww….the affidavits on these things are graphic), but the charges mostly were groundless.
3. According to a landmark study by Sharon Block, elite men often could manipulate the appearance of willingness (or at least resigned consent) that transformed what we would now consider rape into something less than a prosecutable offense. In a society where sex-talk was frequent and rape carried a capital punishment, male jurors were reluctant to kill a man for fucking unless there was some sort of exceptional inappropriateness (like targeting and gravely injuring a very young girl). So many of our records imply, on their face, that women were selling sex when — if you look closer at the social contexts within which these events happen — the sex was forcibly taken and then some money offered as a belated extra-legal reparation (which then might have been taken by the woman who was making the best of a bad situation).
4. Much of our information about sex comes through court records. So historians write about what they can find in primary documents. The emphasis on legally transgressive sex reflects source bias rather than some sort of numerical predominance of sex-for-hire.